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ABSTRACT 
 
There are a number of cataclysmic events that stand out as markedly catastrophic enough to 
cause significant unrest in investors‘ outlook on the stability of the market. In today‘s 
increasingly integrated global market, the key concern for investors in adjusting for such 
situations is to spread their portfolio risk across different risk bases in order to reduce unwanted 
effects from the idiosyncrasy of a particular part of their portfolios. Using the event study 
method and ICAPM-derived measure of market integration, I find that there is evidence for 
market integration‘s global risk sharing effect on abnormal returns from cataclysmic events, 
specifically in regard to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. There is, however, no evidence of 
risk-diffusing effects beyond the event day, even for relatively short post-event windows of 6 and 
11 days. This seems to suggest that market integration as motivated by global risk sharing is only 
effective to disperse the initial shock of a cataclysmic event. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2011, East Japan was hit by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake followed by 
destructive tsunami waves over 100 feet in height that engulfed much of the coastal inland area. 
Dubbed the Great East Japan Earthquake, it was the most powerful earthquake to have ever 
occurred in Japan, causing over 15,000 deaths and enormous infrastructural damages. Even 
before the nation was able to mourn its dead, search for the missing, and take care of the huge 
numbers of homeless, the coastal nuclear plant in Fukushima began to show signs of nuclear 
leakage that many feared would lead to a nuclear meltdown. 
Japan is third largest economy in the world, and the economic and financial implications 
of the aftermath of this catastrophe and the ongoing nuclear threat—many of which inevitably 
would involve other countries—were virtually limitless. Japan is a liberalized country with 
minimal capital controls and a market that is integrated with the markets of other countries to 
varying degrees: its economy was not the only economy to take the hit. Many countries whose 
markets are integrated with Japan‘s also suffered proportionally to their mutual stake. This is 
consistent with the global risk sharing hypothesis that proposes that firms or investors can spread 
risk across their shareholder bases, thereby lowering the individual risk load. 
This international risk sharing phenomenon is not so different from the aftereffects of 
U.S.-originated financial crisis of 2008 when the meltdown of the U.S. subprime mortgage 
market instigated a rippling effect that spread to foreign markets. The financial globalization and 
widespread integration with foreign capital markets created a complex web of credit lines that 
rapidly spread the risk of the collapsing U.S. housing market throughout different countries. 
When the U.S. market burst, a global financial crisis ensued, a salient example of global risk 
sharing in action. 
2 
 
According to the theory of capital market integration, the market had priced the 
perennial threat of earthquake in Japan and rational investors had hedged their positions. 
However, an unfortunate turn of events changed what should have been a country-specific crisis 
that investors could address through diversification to a tragic case of a class-7 nuclear accident. 
The sheer enormity of this aftershock naturally had more significant consequences on investors 
worldwide. 
The feeble attempts of the overly conservative media, the Japanese government, and the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company to pretend the catastrophe was ―managed, and under control,‖ 
clearly contradicting expert opinions from the rest of the world, raised serious concerns, rightful 
anger, and caustic criticisms from both within and outside Japan. With news constantly evolving 
over the month that followed, the international community developed a general skepticism about 
the Japanese government‘s public statements and risk-management abilities. The real threat of a 
nuclear meltdown, leading to uncertainties about the stability of Japanese consumer and credit 
markets, had many possible economic and financial implications, including rebound effects for 
competitors, spillover effects to neighboring or closely tied countries, and potentially persistent 
effects on the general economy of the region. 
Motivation 
Motivated by the occurrence and the development of such disasters, I have posed the 
following question for discussion in this essay: How did the integrated world market react to 
Japan‘s disaster? Did the reactions of markets depend on the degree of integration with the global 
financial market? In other words, are highly integrated markets affected more negatively than 
markets with less integration? 
Every year, there are countless incidents of natural disasters and terrorist attacks around 
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the world. While all of them are disastrous in nature, causing local and regional damage, some 
stand out as markedly catastrophic enough to cause significant unrest in investors‘ outlook on the 
stability of the market—such as the recent earthquake and tsunami that hit Japan. The key 
concern for investors in adjusting for such situations is to spread their portfolio risk across 
different risk bases in order to reduce unwanted effects from the idiosyncrasy of a particular part 
of their portfolios. While some investors may want to take advantage of such effects by timing 
the market or hedging for risks, the unanticipated nature and the cataclysmic magnitude of these 
events often make this difficult. 
In exploring this question, I have looked at other natural disasters, such as the 2004 
Indian Ocean earthquake and selected terrorist attacks. I have not included events such as 
Hurricane Katrina, since such events are more seasonal and therefore predictable in some small 
degree. For Katrina, the trajectory and arrival were constantly announced, and the government 
took a number of anticipatory measures—even if, post-storm, they were deemed appallingly 
insufficient. The extent of damages—though much more disastrous than many had hoped— 
could have been anticipated by and priced in the market. One could argue that terrorist attacks 
are also anticipatable to a certain extent. While that would be true if proper intelligence allowed 
for it, these forms of intelligence are not likely to be readily available to rational financial 
markets and their investors to allow the market to preemptively quantify, model, and price the 
risk of an impending attack. As risk diversification is an important motivation for investors in 
this globalized economy, the potential concerns about the negative (or positive, for that matter) 
effects of unexpected catastrophic events are understandable, and there are significant issues to 
consider. 
Market integration has its costs and benefits. One of the key motivations behind market 
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integration is global and regional risk sharing—which is the main focus of this study. According 
to Van Wincoop (2011), there is conflicting evidence as to the benefits, if any, of international 
risk sharing. However, the global market has become more and more integrated, beginning in the 
1980s for developed markets and increasingly in emerging markets from the 1990s (Ayuso & 
Blanco, 2001; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2011). At the same time, the world has 
experienced more frequent banking crises: around 67 since 1980, 52 of them in developing 
countries.
1
 While the increasingly complex nature of financial systems due to technological 
advancements and sophisticated financial instruments could be partially responsible for this trend,  
increased market integration could well also be a cause. If so, the continuing trend of capital 
market integration despite increased vulnerability to banking crises could be suggestive of a 
definite benefit of market integration—global risk sharing, for instance—to the extent that 
policy-making authorities and private-sector market participants are willing to continue to open 
up and integrate. 
By empirically exploring the above question, this study will effectively test global risk 
sharing ex post to see whether it is indeed the motivating factor for market integration. The null 
statement of the design is that there are no significant differences in market reaction for varying 
degrees of integration. According to the financial theory behind market integration (or 
liberalization), if market integration really does a good job in spreading the risks from the 
consequences of catastrophic events across investors in different markets as purported, markets 
that are more integrated should be affected more negatively than less integrated markets are. If 
this turned out to be the case, it would suggest that the target countries shared the risk effectively 
and were hit relatively less hard than if they had been less integrated with the global market. If 
                                           
1
 See Jeffrey A. Frankel, Address to Conference on “Preventing Bank Crises: Lessons from Recent Global Bank 
Failures,” sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the World Bank, Lake Bluff, Illinois, June 11, 
1997. 
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more integrated global markets and less integrated markets were affected similarly, it would 
imply that global risk sharing does not deliver the intended benefits when countries decide to 
liberalize or de-segment. This can be evidence for other theoretical explanations for the 
motivation to integrate markets. For example, in the case of countries with poor investor rights, 
the bonding hypothesis could be a reasonable explanation for investments in foreign markets, but 
such discussions are outside the scope of this study. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature on 
on catastrophic events and quantifying market integration. Section III describes the model that is 
employed to empirically test the question of motivation for market integration. Section IV 
describes the data used in this study. Section V summarizes key results. Section VI is a 
conclusion that reviews the limitations of the study and offers suggestions for possible future 
research directions. 
 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
Event study of effects of catastrophes on stock markets 
 When a catastrophic event occurs, the stock market is one of the first places that shows 
an immediate reaction, reflecting investors‘ fear about heightened risks affecting their 
investments. With technological advancements in the financial industry, concerns about 
cataclysmic events and their potential direct and indirect effects on a company‘s future may 
affect stock prices very quickly. The panic from events that occur in one country can have far-
reaching effects in different countries in the globally integrated equity market. 
Terrorist attacks that shake the stability and security of a company, an industry, a country, 
or a region can have almost immediate and potentially lasting effects not only on local markets 
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but also on global financial markets. Chen and Siems (2004) employed event study to assess the 
effects of 14 terrorist attacks on the U.S. market, as well as the effects of two events—Iraq‘s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the September 11, 2001, attacks—on global capital markets. 
They found evidence that terrorist attacks do have significant short-term impacts on global 
capital markets, with higher resilience and quicker recovery for markets with a stronger banking 
and finance sector. Karolyi and Martell (2010) also found significant negative stock price 
reaction to terrorist attacks, the effect of which was larger for wealthier and more democratic 
countries. 
Only a few studies have looked exclusively at the impact of natural disasters on the stock 
market. Worthington and Valadkhani (2004) studied this via intervention analysis with 
autoregressive-moving-average (ARMA) models, finding evidence of major effects on market 
returns from bushfires, cyclones, and earthquakes, but little effect from severe storms and floods. 
Chesney, Reshetar, and Karaman (2011) tested three different methods—an event-study approach, 
a nonparametric methodology, and a filtered GARCH-EVT approach—to analyze the impact of 
different types of catastrophes such as terrorist attacks, financial crashes, and natural disasters on 
financial markets. They found immediate negative abnormal returns after terrorist attacks and 
financial crashes and delayed effects after natural disasters. Brounrn and Derwall (2010) also 
found more pronounced price declines for terrorist attacks than for earthquakes, but both with 
swift recoveries within a week. 
Berkman, Jacobsen, and Lee (2011) concluded that the time-varying probability of rare 
disaster risks—such as the ones under our interest—are actually priced, filling in the theoretical 
gaps of the equity premium puzzle and the volatility puzzle. Moreover, Garmaise and Moskowitz 
(2009) have shown that imperfections in the insurance market may lead to restrictions of credit 
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supply to such catastrophe-prone properties. The resulting implications for different markets tied 
to certain target countries—those with continual likelihood of earthquakes, for example—would 
be of interest. 
Measuring market integration 
While no consensus has been reached, there are numerous implications and applications 
to explore in regard to market-integration measures. Because of this, many studies have 
attempted to come up with different methods to measure market integration. 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) defined market integration as assets with the same level of 
risk having identical expected returns in different markets. A completely nonintegrated market, 
or segmented market, can be represented by classical models such as the capital asset-pricing 
model (CAPM). A perfectly integrated market can be represented by various modified versions 
of the CAPM, often with exchange risk, such as the world CAPM (Harvey, 1991), the world 
arbitrage pricing theory (Solnik, 1983), and so on. The middle ground between the two would be 
a mild segmentation model (Errunza, Losq, & Padmanabhan, 1992; Patro, 2005). 
One common approach is to simply use the correlation of local market returns with the 
world market returns as one proxy. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) pointed out that this is 
problematic because a country‘s market could actually be integrated with the rest of the world 
but still have low correlation due to the differences among industries in the mix. Measures based 
on the asset-pricing model that are constant over time also raise questions because they ignore 
the possibility of changes in market liberalization through policy and regulation amendments that 
can fundamentally alter the degree to which a local market is integrated with the world. Many 
studies have found evidence of time-varying prices of risk, which in turn implies time-varying 
market-integration measures (Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Carrieri, Errunza, & Hogan, 2009; De 
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Santis, Gerard, & Hillion, 2003; Dumas & Solnik, 1995; Gerard, Thanyalakpark, & Batten, 2003; 
Harvey, 1991). 
 As alternatives, a range of studies have attempted to suggest a time-varying 
measurement of market integration. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) used a conditional regime-
switching model to find some evidence of time-varying integration, capturing the points at which 
country-specific information set tips the econometric likelihood of regime switch from 
integration to segmentation. Korajczyk (1996) suggested measuring the deviations of asset 
returns with an equilibrium asset-pricing model that assumes complete integration. He argued 
that the law of one price should hold for completely integrated markets so any pricing error can 
be a proxy for market segmentation. Yeoh, Arsad, and Hooy (2010) applied the kalman filter (KF) 
technique to change a static single-factor international CAPM (ICAPM) model into a time-
varying model, recursively computing a dynamic measure of pricing errors of market returns in 
Malaysia and Singapore. Most studies found that market integration tends to be lower for 
emerging markets than for developed markets, and the measure tends to increase over time. This 
is consistent with what we know about the general trend of global market integration.  
News-based measures could also provide a possible alternative measurement of 
integration. A line of studies implemented simple-shock-spillover models to measure the ratio of 
domestic equity volatility in individual countries explained by global risk factors (Bekaert & 
Harvey, 1997; Ng, 2000; Fratzscher, 2001).  
Adam, Jappelli, Menichini, Padula, and Pagano (2002) and Baele, Ferrando, Hordahl, 
Krylova, and Monnet (2004) provided a broad overview of various market integration 
measurement methods. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Event study 
Considering each country‘s stock market index as a single portfolio, a widely used 
method to identify the effect of an unexpected event on a market index is the event-study 
approach as pioneered by Brown and Warner (1985). Most of the literature above employed this 
standard event-study test to single out abnormal returns caused by unexpected cataclysmic events 
such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks, analyzing the statistical significance of differences in 
return abnormality around a designated event window. 
In order to determine whether the capital market experienced significant abnormal 
returns in response to the cataclysmic events, Brown and Warner‘s (1985) mean-adjusted-returns 
approach was employed. The return in excess of mean return was calculated as 
               
where Aj,t is the abnormal return of stock index j (AR0), Rjt is the actual observed return on index 
j at time t, and   j is a mean of returns calculated as 
   
 
  
     
     
     
   
The estimation window is t = [–30, –11], the event date is t = 0. The estimation window is also 
done at t = [–50, –11] for robustness, which yields no qualitative differences. 
 The null hypothesis is that the excess return is zero. The test statistic is calculated as a 
ratio of the excess return on the event day to its estimated standard deviation: 
                      
where 
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For cases in which a catastrophe has persistent effects and thus the market needs more time to 
evaluate the full extent of detriments, it would be meaningful to look at the post-event period. In 
order to look at the effects on a longer window, cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) 
over t = [0, 5] and t = [0, 10] are also analyzed. The CARj,1 and CAR j,2 are respectively 
calculated as a simple summation of abnormal returns Ajt over the respective periods 
            
 
   
             
  
   
   
and the two multi-interval test statistics are 
                
       
 
   
 
 
                      
       
  
   
 
 
    
where the terms in the denominator are from above. The null hypothesis is that each CAR is 
equal to zero. Following from Brown and Warner (1985), Aj,t is assumed to be independent, 
identically distributed, and normal; the test statistic θ is therefore distributed Student-t under the 
null hypothesis. 
Market integration 
 Taking the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM as the correct asset-pricing model, the financial 
markets are integrated if the single-factor ICAPM holds for each country j‘s market index 
portfolio and the benchmark world portfolio is mean-variance efficient: 
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where Rj,t is the monthly return of country j‘s market portfolio, RF,t is the international risk-free 
rate, RW,t is the monthly return of world portfolio, and  j,t is the residual. Using monthly returns 
mitigates problems arising from irregular market holidays. The 3-month U.S. treasury bill rate 
was used as the international risk-free rate. To make a time-varying measure of market 
integration in the simplest sense, I used a 36-month rolling basis, hence t = –1, –2 . . . –36. The 
R-squared values of each country were used as a continuous measure of market integration, 0 
being completely segmented and 1 being perfectly integrated. 
Linear regression 
 In order to analyze the relationship between abnormal returns and market integration, the 
following linear regression model was used: 
                                                
where j represents each country, t represents each event, bn represents the vector of coefficients 
for each control variable from alternative hypotheses, bk represents the vector of dummy 
variables identifying each event, and uj is the residual. 
 The abnormal returns of event t in market j, ARj,t, were from the event study conducted 
above. The simple magnitude of abnormal returns (and CARs) varying in statistical significance 
could be problematic for use as a meaningful relative comparison of significant abnormal returns 
after each event. On the other hand, the θ-statistics correct for standard error, maintain the signs, 
and are continuous measures, so the θ-statistics were used as ARj,t. The market integration index 
of market j at the time of event t, MIj,t, is the R-squared values computed from the market 
integration computed above. 
 There may be alternative explanations to differential market abnormal returns from 
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cataclysmic events. These should be controlled for in the regression model to single out the effect 
of market integration on abnormal returns. Among potential factors are market size, market 
volatility, economic growth, and national credit risk. The size of the domestic economy may have 
an effect, with large and more complex economies being more vulnerable to various events. 
Likewise, markets that are more volatile in the period right before the event (ex ante the event) 
may be naturally more sensitive to unforeseen cataclysmic events. Markets in countries with 
faster economic growth, as measured by GDP growth, may be more sensitive to such events. And 
countries with a lower sovereign credit rating, which is closely correlated with sovereign yield 
spreads representing a country‘s capital risk, may be viewed as more vulnerable to the detriments 
of a catastrophic event. I acknowledge that limiting the potential alternative hypotheses to these 
four factors for simplicity‘s sake may leave some room for misinterpretation of causal effects. 
Future research should include other country attributes that may also affect abnormal returns to 
catastrophes. 
 
IV. DATA 
In order to examine how each event affected different markets, I used DataStream to 
obtain return data on different countries‘ major stock exchanges at and around the time of 
disasters between 1998 and 2011. Using the aggregate country-level index as a portfolio helped 
avoid some survivorship bias problems, as I did not include or exclude a firm based on whether 
there is data throughout the estimation, event, and post-event windows. Following previous 
event-study papers, I chose daily returns as the most appropriate interval, as the daily 
development in the news would most likely have had immediate effects either within the first day 
or in the next few trading days to reflect the market reaction to the catastrophic event. 
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DataStream provides the longest and the most comprehensive list of daily returns on various 
country indices of my interest. 
For many developed and emerging markets, DataStream has several major stock 
exchanges, each index covering a different base of firms. In order to maintain consistency in 
index base selection, I chose to use Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) country indices 
(50 markets, 23 developed and 27 emerging markets) over each country‘s major indices. A 
benefit to using MSCI country indices is the way DataStream calculates total returns. 
DataStream has a total return index (RI) and a price index (PI) for each index, where total RI 
includes reinvested dividends while PI does not. Although DataStream has a PI for every 
country‘s major stock exchange, it does not have a total RI for all of them. Every MSCI country 
index has a total RI, making it preferable to use for the sake of consistency over major stock 
exchange indices. The appendix has a list of the 50 countries used in this study, the time period 
of DataStream availability, the DataStream mnemonic, and the respective major stock exchanges, 
if any, for each country. The selection of the major stock exchange for countries with multiple 
exchanges was followed from Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). The analysis done on the major 
stock exchange indices yielded the same results and hence was omitted. 
For every local currency index (RI) in DataStream, I chose an alternative conversion to 
U.S. dollars (USD). Having all the indices in a common currency, USD, I could mitigate the 
exchange-rate noise. This follows a technique employed by virtually all previous studies of 
international finance. 
In case of a national or market holiday, DataStream records the identical value as the 
previous day, which yields a zero return. Different countries have different national or market 
holidays, and different cataclysmic events could result in irregular market closures. For example, 
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after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, the U.S. market closed and reopened on September 
17, while most other countries did not close. For each country, I shifted the estimation, event, 
and post-event windows forward and backward in time to fill in the missing (market closed) days, 
ensuring that each country for each event had a guaranteed 20-day estimation window (20 
trading days of nonzero returns before 10 trading days of non-zero returns), the event day (or the 
most immediate open trading day), and a 10-day post-event window (10 trading days of nonzero 
returns following a nonzero-return event day). There was a concern that when a market was 
intentionally closed down after an event such as the September 11, 2011, attacks, the market‘s 
processing of the catastrophe‘s effects on the market would be cushioned, which could lead to 
asynchronous treatment of each event‘s CAR. However, it is also important to note that, at least 
in this specific case, any cushion created by the closed days was not enough to completely 
insulate the market from largest one-week drop in the history of Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
Moreover, because the focus of this study was to analyze how the market processes the effects of 
a cataclysmic event on the day of the event (or the immediate subsequent trading day), relative to 
each market‘s integration with the global market, the main objective of the exercise was 
preserved. Also, it would be more problematic to consider AR or CAR of a day that the market 
did not open, which would incorrectly yield a 0% AR or a CAR biased toward zero. 
 The time difference around the globe when the particular event happened also called for 
appropriate adjustments. For each country, I coded in the time zone differences (adjusted for 
daylight savings time, depending on the country and the time of the year) to adjust the time of 
the event occurrence to the local time for each market. Once time differences were adjusted for, I 
also coded in the stock market opening and closing hours. If an event happened after market 
closing hour, the event day is coded as the next trading day to reflect the abnormal return as 
15 
 
processed by the market on the first possible trading day post-event. In the case of a prolonged 
event with stories developing over a period of time, the event time point is determined 
subjectively to appropriately reflect the majority of the event‘s effects on the stock market. 
Similarly, if an event happened on a weekend, the first trading day after the weekend was coded 
as the event day. Such adjustments made it possible to mitigate the incorrect treatment and 
analysis of normal returns as abnormal returns. 
 Monthly market returns for calculating the market integration measure were obtained the 
same way as the daily returns. Unlike daily returns, monthly returns do not particularly suffer 
from time differences or zero returns from holidays, so these were not of any notable concern for 
the purposes of this study. 
 Each country‘s year-end gross domestic product in USD and GDP growth data were 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook Database as published by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in September 2011. The IMF calculates year-on-year GDP percentage change at 
constant prices with country-specific base years. 
 The sovereign credit ratings were obtained from Bloomberg. The credit ratings from 
Moody‘s, Standard & Poor‘s, and Fitch were linearly transformed into a numerical scale from 1 
to 21, then averaged to make a balanced measure of the long-term credit risk of each country at 
the time of each event. The linear transformation of a 21-point scale has been commonly used in 
previous studies that attempt to perform ordinary least square (OLS) analysis on numerical 
representation of credit ratings (Afonso, 2003; Afonso, Gomes, & Rother, 2007; Butler & Fauver, 
2006). See the Appendix for the conversion table of bond ratings. 
 The monthly volatility of each market was calculated using the standard method from 
the standard deviation of daily returns. 
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Brief recounting of each cataclysmic event 
 In addition to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, the following catastrophes were 
also selected to be analyzed in conjunction. These events were particularly significant because 
they affected the biggest markets in the world that tended to be more deeply integrated with the 
rest of the world, which would bring out the effects of interest in this study more clearly. 
Although the list of catastrophic events was subjectively selected, the general criteria for 
inclusion were the relative size and importance of the target country‘s market in the global 
economy; the unexpectedness or shock factor; and the magnitude of the economic, infrastructural, 
or political damage done regionally. Potential concern about selection bias from this particular 
list is acknowledged and addressed in the final section. Information related to each event is from 
LexisNexis. 
September 11, 2011—New York City and Washington, D.C., area, United States. Early on 
a Tuesday morning, four American commercial jets were hijacked by a then-unknown group of 
terrorists. The hijacked airplanes were each subsequently flown into different targets—two 
crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, one crashing into the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and one crash-landing in Pennsylvania. This was the first-ever 
major attack on the mainland United States by a foreign power since the last century, resulting in 
2,996 deaths and more than 6,000 injured. The global financial market reacted significantly to 
the news of the event, and the U.S. stock exchanges remained closed until September 17. This 
attack eventually provided the cause for heightened security and sensitivity to terrorism around 
the world and set off the so-called War on Terror. 
March 11, 2004—Madrid, Spain. A series of near-simultaneous bombings on four trains 
departing from the Alcalá de Henares Station devastated thousands of Thursday-morning 
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commuters in Madrid. With 191 fatalities and 1,800 injured, this was the biggest and deadliest 
terrorist attack to have occurred on European soil. It occurred exactly two and a half years after 
the 9/11 attack and just three days prior to national elections. Many countries around the world 
responded with a surge of political condemnation and civil demonstrations. 
December 26, 2004—Coast off Indonesia, Indian Ocean. When the massive fault line off 
the coast of the northern island of Sumatra ruptured, one of the strongest earthquakes in recorded 
history hit under the sea, causing deadly tsunami waves that struck all along the coast of 
southeast Asia and even Africa. It was easily the biggest natural disaster in recent years, not only 
killing 230,000 people but also destroying the lives of millions, affecting over 10 countries. 
Currencies of affected countries fell sharply as the large-scale infrastructural damage, with added 
complications of possible sanitation problems and resulting endemic diseases, posed serious 
uncertainties in the economic recovery process for the poorer countries. The ironic fact that these 
poor nations around Indian Ocean had only recently decided to forego an expensive collective 
early tsunami warning system made this a virtually unanticipated catastrophe. 
July 7, 2005—London, United Kingdom. The next major terrorist attack occurred in 
London when four suicide bombers set off a series of coordinated explosions on three 
underground trains and a double-decker bus, killing 56 people and injuring approximately 700. 
Although Europe‘s second-largest economy was shaken by these fatal attacks, other markets 
exhibited limited reaction despite rising uncertainty about new violence and a weakened British 
pound, possibly due to prior experience with similar attacks in September 2001 and March 2004. 
May 12, 2008—Sichuan, China. Amid a booming Chinese economy, a deadly 
earthquake that killed 69,195 people and left 18,392 missing was one of the costliest natural 
disasters in the history of modern China. Although limited to only one region in the heart of 
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mainland China, the economic aftereffects of this catastrophe and strong aftershocks were 
constantly under wary watch. 
 
V. RESULTS 
 Table 1 summarizes the event-day abnormal returns and the 6-day cumulative abnormal 
returns corrected for standard error. Abnormal returns were more significant for terrorist attacks 
than for natural disasters, which is consistent with previous studies done on both types of 
catastrophes. The September 11, 2001, attack exhibited the most significantly negative impact on 
global stock markets. 
Table 1: Abnormal returns on global capital markets 
The event-day abnormal returns and the 6-day cumulative abnormal returns corrected for 
standard error reported. The 11-day cumulative abnormal returns do not show any qualitative 
difference and are omitted. 
 
 
Global stock market
Australia -4.74 *** -4.51 *** -1.19 *** 0.83 -0.22 0.34 0.65 0.42 -0.65 0.05 -0.89 -1.39 *
Austria -0.06 -0.99 -0.84 -0.14 -0.56 -0.12 0.53 -0.69 0.07 1.66 * -0.30 0.80
Belgium -8.19 *** -5.13 *** -2.89 *** -1.64 * -1.30 2.07 ** 1.00 -0.16 0.18 -0.36 -0.26 -0.80
Canada -5.17 *** -3.86 *** -0.54 *** -0.19 0.06 -0.11 0.78 0.72 0.60 0.79 -0.15 -0.57
Denmark -1.05 -1.72 * -1.55 -0.51 -1.23 0.47 0.87 0.00 0.39 2.37 ** -0.70 0.51
Finland -0.98 2.33 ** -1.73 -1.70 * -1.73 ** 1.61 * 0.09 -0.37 0.22 0.90 -0.61 0.64
France -6.04 *** -2.72 *** -2.64 *** -1.24 -1.45 * 1.75 ** 0.59 0.08 0.68 1.29 -0.59 -0.46
Germany -7.04 *** -2.52 ** -2.53 *** -1.01 -2.12 ** 1.55 * 0.11 -0.28 0.77 1.18 -0.96 -1.32
Greece 0.64 -3.32 *** -1.59 -0.40 -1.02 0.47 1.45 * 0.57 0.06 0.56 1.18 1.08
Hong Kong -7.54 *** -3.75 *** -1.39 *** -0.72 -1.57 * 1.56 * 0.51 -0.54 -0.25 0.05 -0.94 -1.23
Ireland -0.90 -3.36 *** -0.96 0.62 -0.97 0.97 0.55 -0.08 0.63 0.09 -0.31 0.42
Italy -7.29 *** -5.95 *** -1.97 *** -1.64 * -2.28 ** 2.04 ** 0.43 -0.90 0.17 0.55 -0.42 -0.37
Japan -4.61 *** -0.56 -1.23 *** 2.64 *** -0.84 -0.06 0.49 0.92 0.12 0.41 -0.33 -4.21 ***
Netherlands -6.93 *** -3.82 *** -2.63 *** -1.54 * -2.17 ** 0.40 0.56 -0.07 0.35 0.49 -0.91 -0.86
New Zealand -8.40 *** -6.89 *** 0.34 *** 0.50 -0.30 0.34 0.15 0.29 -0.08 -0.11 -1.18 -0.77
Norway 4.27 *** -2.33 ** -0.99 *** -0.47 -2.52 ** -0.28 0.60 -0.41 0.24 1.00 -0.53 -0.11
Portugal -4.99 *** -2.71 *** -1.97 *** -0.98 -0.59 1.10 0.98 -0.26 -0.69 -1.09 -0.13 0.30
Singapore -6.38 *** -8.06 *** -1.23 *** -0.32 -2.44 ** 0.35 -0.31 0.61 0.23 0.08 -0.67 -1.15
Spain -2.62 *** -2.25 ** -1.57 *** -1.51 * -2.35 ** 1.66 * 0.34 -0.64 0.94 0.70 0.00 0.57
Sweden -4.71 *** -1.94 ** -2.20 *** -1.15 -2.08 ** 1.86 ** 0.45 -0.08 0.54 0.49 -1.07 0.30
Switzerland -5.66 *** -0.81 -2.73 *** -1.05 -0.58 2.11 ** 0.58 0.47 -0.21 0.94 -0.46 -1.31
United Kingdom -5.39 *** -1.55 * -2.97 *** -1.09 -4.70 *** -0.05 0.45 -0.75 0.58 0.30 -0.55 -0.60
United States -5.42 *** -3.32 *** -2.24 *** -0.04 0.40 2.04 ** -0.83 -0.86 0.64 0.31 0.82 -0.69
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
WTC attack
2001-09-11
Madrid bombing
2004-03-11
London bombing
2005-07-07
Indian Ocean
earthquake
2004-12-26
Sichuan earthquake
2008-05-12
Great Kanto
earthquake
2011-03-11
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
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Figure 1 shows the time series of the measure of market integration for developed 
countries and emerging markets. From 1995 to 2012, there is a clear upward trend, with a sudden 
 
Figure 1: World market integration, 1995–2012 
Time series of average of R-squared values for 23 developed markets and 27 emerging markets. 
(Continued)
Global stock market
Argentina -1.50 * -1.53 * -0.54 * -0.07 1.06 0.80 -0.36 -0.05 1.78 ** 2.41 ** 0.30 0.46
Brazil -5.63 *** -1.62 * -1.33 *** 0.65 -0.49 0.54 -0.10 -0.11 1.15 1.58 * 0.64 0.20
Chile -7.77 *** -4.80 *** -0.24 *** -1.63 * -1.21 0.27 -0.24 -0.55 -0.06 1.30 0.04 0.60
China -2.86 *** 0.98 -1.83 *** -0.85 -1.62 * -0.17 0.01 -0.65 -0.29 0.07 -1.05 -0.98
Colombia -4.30 *** -4.57 *** -0.18 *** -0.30 0.30 -0.11 1.83 ** 1.64 * -0.81 -1.58 * 0.19 2.18 **
Czech Republic -1.10 -1.81 ** -1.57 -0.85 -0.64 0.49 0.18 0.38 1.13 4.36 *** 1.23 1.48 *
Egypt -1.90 ** -1.31 0.28 ** -0.32 -1.60 * -1.46 * 0.04 2.93 *** -3.76 *** -3.16 *** 0.25 0.78
Hungary -4.43 *** -1.15 -1.75 *** 0.23 -1.31 -0.09 1.91 ** 1.23 0.84 0.52 0.89 0.93
India -5.26 *** -7.72 *** -1.15 *** -1.31 -3.42 *** -2.38 ** -0.20 0.71 -0.43 -0.07 -0.60 -0.29
Indonesia -1.42 * -1.74 ** -1.67 * -0.43 -1.78 ** -0.46 0.58 0.31 0.19 1.29 -1.14 -1.10
Israel -2.72 *** -1.89 ** -2.29 *** -0.62 -1.44 * 1.47 * 0.35 -0.47 -0.29 0.67 n/a n/a
Jordan -0.56 -1.86 ** -0.83 -0.43 -0.53 -3.21 *** 0.59 1.52 * 0.00 -1.57 * 0.54 1.42 *
Korea -6.74 *** -2.79 *** -2.52 *** 1.15 -0.88 1.64 * 0.13 1.07 -0.60 -0.57 -0.87 0.40
Malaysia -3.86 *** -4.45 *** 0.10 *** 0.38 0.58 0.74 -0.24 -0.53 -0.11 -1.14 -1.25 0.10
Mexico -5.37 *** -2.98 *** -1.88 *** -0.49 -0.29 0.73 0.15 0.08 -0.01 1.06 0.71 -0.22
Morocco -1.11 -1.25 0.33 -0.42 -0.14 1.56 * 0.19 -0.74 1.31 0.69 0.01 0.40
Pakistan -4.55 *** -4.78 *** 0.29 *** 0.36 0.04 -0.61 0.03 -0.29 -0.29 -3.01 *** 0.05 -0.77
Peru -1.03 0.68 0.99 0.84 1.51 * 0.31 0.11 -0.07 -0.30 -0.03 1.71 * 0.61
Philippines -2.78 *** -1.94 ** -0.81 *** 0.54 0.85 0.54 -0.01 0.82 1.77 ** 1.46 * 0.49 0.00
Poland -1.82 ** -1.50 * -1.26 ** -0.59 -1.96 ** -0.36 1.25 0.42 1.41 * 0.61 -0.18 0.97
Russia -0.62 -2.29 ** -1.35 0.93 -0.91 0.61 1.18 1.53 * 0.58 2.12 ** -0.44 0.64
South Africa -2.91 *** -3.70 *** -1.62 *** -0.31 -0.43 2.14 ** 0.33 0.25 0.45 0.56 1.10 -0.43
Sri Lanka 0.11 -0.91 -0.30 -0.28 0.91 -0.07 -0.26 -3.77 *** -0.30 -1.81 ** -1.15 -2.00 **
Taiwan 0.31 -3.64 *** -2.40 -0.75 -0.93 1.10 -0.27 0.81 1.67 * 0.96 0.14 0.28
Thailand -0.04 -3.35 *** -0.34 -0.42 0.07 1.00 -1.06 -0.42 -1.66 * 0.72 -1.14 -0.51
Turkey -2.71 *** -3.44 *** -0.95 *** -0.44 -1.00 0.10 0.68 0.65 -0.32 0.16 0.40 0.52
Venezuela 2.31 ** -1.32 -0.22 ** 0.42 0.51 1.22 0.65 0.79 n/a n/a n/a n/a
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
2011-03-11
WTC attack Madrid bombing London bombing
Indian Ocean
earthquake Sichuan earthquake
Great Kanto
earthquake
2001-09-11 2004-03-11 2005-07-07 2004-12-26 2008-05-12
6-day
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Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
6-day
CAR
Event-day
AR
Developed markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging markets 
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noticeable jump around October 2008, when the global financial crisis overtook the global 
markets. This increasing trend of global market integration is consistent with previous studies 
(Bekaert et al., 2011; Pukthuanthong & Roll, 2009). 
Table 2 shows the correlations among the variables in the model. Market integration as 
proxied by the R-squared values from the single-factor ICAPM model is negatively correlated 
with stock market volatility and one-year lagged GDP growth and positively correlated with 
GDP and sovereign bond rating. 
Table 2: Pearson correlation matrix 
 
 The regression results for the event-day abnormal returns are shown in Table 3. The 
coefficient for the market integration measure is consistently negative and significant. When 
sovereign bond rating is added to the model, however, the significance drops out completely, 
along with all the other control variables except for GDP. In the context of my model, this can be 
interpreted as follows: markets more integrated with the global market experience more negative 
abnormal returns on the day of a cataclysmic event. In other words, the sudden spike of 
uncertainty risk that should drive down market returns even further is distributed across different 
countries around the world—thus, global risk sharing is in effect. 
R2 Vol GDPg GDP Sov
R2 1.0000 -0.1022 -0.3024 0.6412 0.6470
0.0788 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Vol -0.1022 1.0000 0.1391 -0.1143 -0.5270
0.0788 0.0165 0.0491 <.0001
GDPg -0.3024 0.1391 1.0000 -0.1440 -0.3247
<.0001 0.0165 0.0130 <.0001
GDP 0.6412 -0.1143 -0.1440 1.0000 0.4482
<.0001 0.0491 0.0130 <.0001
Sov 0.6470 -0.5270 -0.3247 0.4482 1.0000
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 297
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
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Table 3: Regression results on event-day abnormal returns 
 
The coefficient for the size of the economy as measured by GDP is negative and 
significant in all models, as hypothesized. Economic growth as measured by one-year lagged 
GDP growth is also negative as hypothesized, but not significant. The coefficients for market 
volatility and sovereign bond rating are both not significant. 
The event dummy variables are not shown but were generally highly significant. The 
effects arising from the widely different nature, magnitude, conditions, and type of each 
individual event are captured by these dummies, which mitigate event-specific variances 
influencing the effects of market integration and other alternative hypothesis variables. 
The R-square of each model shows that the model exhibits an explanatory power of 
around 50%. All the models are significant at 0.0001 levels as measured by F-tests. 
For multiday cumulative abnormal returns, as shown in Table 4, any significance of 
market integration falls out, suggesting that there is no evidence that market integration has any 
effect on longer windows beyond the event day. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MI -1.4661 *** -0.9072 ** -1.3130 *** -1.6354 *** -0.8477 * -0.8905 * -0.4532
(0.3357) (0.4372) (0.3530) (0.3563) (0.4679) (0.4726) (0.5554)
GDP -0.1619 ** -0.1632 ** -0.1579 *
(0.0817) (0.0817) (0.0816)
Vol 4.3604 5.1686 2.0428
(3.1551) (3.1493) (3.7781)
GDPg -4.2857 -4.2843 -4.9222
(3.0640) (3.0588) (3.0822)
Sov -0.0432 * -0.0412
(0.0229) (0.0277)
Intercept -0.3467 0.3445 -0.7094 ** -0.0560 0.0751 0.2108 0.8943
(0.2410) (0.4234) (0.3561) (0.3180) (0.3279) (0.5108) (0.6856)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
Adj.-R2 0.4645 0.4699 0.4662 0.4663 0.4692 0.4741 0.4763
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4: Regression results on 6-day and 11-day CARs 
 
The R-square of each model is lower in Table 4, which shows a decrease in explanatory 
power of the model for longer window cumulative abnormal returns as compared to that of the 
event-day abnormal returns. 
 
Panel A: 6-day CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MI 0.1465 0.1130 0.2520 -0.0595 0.4660 0.2354 -0.4532
(0.3047) (0.3995) (0.3209) (0.3226) (0.4265) (0.4314) (0.5082)
GDP 0.00971 0.01384 0.01669
(0.0747) (0.0746) (0.0747)
Vol 3.00529 3.45048 1.77645
(2.8680) (2.8745) (3.4572)
GDPg -5.21735 * -5.53689 ** -5.87853 **
(2.7738) (2.7919) (2.8204)
Sov -0.02229 -0.02207
(0.0208) (0.0253)
Intercept 0.50884 ** 0.46737 0.25887 0.86281 *** 0.72676 ** 0.53837 0.90438
(0.2188) (0.3869) (0.3237) (0.2879) (0.2989) (0.4662) (0.6273)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
Adj.-R2 0.4274 0.4254 0.4276 0.4323 0.4277 0.4314 0.4309
Panel B: 11-day CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
MI -0.2665 -0.2433 -0.1679 -0.4106 -0.0004 -0.2918 -0.1276
(0.3343) (0.4383) (0.3522) (0.3552) (0.4683) (0.4754) (0.5606)
GDP -0.0067 -0.0051 -0.0031
(0.0819) (0.0822) (0.0824)
Vol 2.8063 3.1591 1.9859
(3.1481) (3.1679) (3.8130)
GDPg -3.6497 -3.8958 -4.1353
(3.0541) (3.0769) (3.1107)
Sov -0.0186 -0.0155
(0.0229) (0.0279)
Intercept 0.6833 *** 0.7120 * 0.4499 0.9310 *** 0.8648 *** 0.7067 0.9632
(0.2400) (0.4245) (0.3553) (0.3170) (0.3281) (0.5138) (0.6919)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
Adj.-R2 0.3981 0.3961 0.3977 0.3990 0.3974 0.3969 0.3955
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There is evidence for market integration‘s global risk sharing effect on abnormal returns 
from cataclysmic events, specifically in regard to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. There is, 
however, no evidence of risk-diffusing effects beyond the event day, even for relatively short 
post-event windows of 6 and 11 days. This seems to suggest that market integration as motivated 
by global risk sharing is only effective to disperse the initial shock of a cataclysmic event. This 
study was inconclusive in explaining any differential effects of market integration for events that 
either last for multiple days or develop post-event complications. 
This study‘s aim was not only to give a snapshot of the integration conditions of the 
current global capital market but also to add to the understanding of the global risk sharing 
hypothesis. It was designed to be modified and replicated to examine a more extensive range of 
largely exogenous disasters, be they natural, political, or war-related. Every catastrophic event 
has a wide range of situational factors that may complicate analyses such as the ones conducted 
in this study. The potential concern about the selection criteria of catastrophic events for this 
study is acknowledged and should be tried and tested in future studies. 
Possible future extensions 
If access to data permits, the model-free, point-in-time measurement of market 
segmentation (integration) developed by Bekaert et al. (2011) would provide a great alternative 
measurement of market integration to the one used in this study. Moreover, while limited by the 
scope and availability of industry-level data for every country in this study, an added component 
of industry-level could greatly expand this study. Since each industry trades differently and may 
be integrated differently, an analysis of industry composition and structure within each domestic 
stock market could also prove to be revealing. 
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Future studies can test whether these effects are differentially persistent depending on 
market integration. Similar to Chen and Siems‘s (2004) work, the number of days that it took 
each stock market to rebound to normal could be used for this purpose. Similarly, looking at how 
different countries of differing global market integration react as the story of a cataclysmic event 
unfolds would also be interesting. Examining how news developments over time in different 
countries—optimistic versus pessimistic—affect the respective markets‘ reactions would provide 
a time-varying differential effect for markets with varying degrees of integration. Do closely 
integrated countries react optimistically to protect share values—reacting more positively to 
positive news, and less negatively to negative news? Or are they more skeptical so as to 
accurately price risk as quickly as possible—reacting more negatively to negative news and less 
positively to positive news? What about the reactions for less integrated countries? 
Furthermore, on a slight tangent, another really interesting question to address would be 
price-discovery effect. Maloney and Mulherin (2003) documented the Challenger crash accident 
in 1986, when the domestic market essentially ―discovered‖ the manufacturing firm at fault for 
the shuttle‘s explosion, before any official statement was even made. They claimed this as 
evidence for an efficient market. Here, a similar idea expanded over today‘s global market 
reaction to the current disaster could be tested. For instance, there could be an information 
asymmetry problem arising from the weak governance of the Tokyo Electric Power Company—
the main culprit under question suspected of overlooking prior signs and warnings from the 
reactors‘ architects. Despite ineffective attempts by Tokyo Electric Power Company to cover up 
what was blatantly obvious to the rest of the world, examining how different stock markets 
around the world reacted could give evidence of a ―price discovery‖ effect in an ―efficient‖ 
global market. Similarly, in a perfectly efficient global market, given perfect transfer of such 
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intelligence, the global stock markets could provide hints about terrorist attacks from initially 
unknown sources of origin. 
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APPENDIX 
S&P, Moody‘s, and Fitch rating systems and linear transformations 
 
  
27 
 
REFERENCES 
Adam, K., Jappelli, T., Menichini, A., Padula, M. & Pagano, M. (2002). Analyse, compare, and 
apply alternative indicators and monitoring methodologies to measure the evolution of 
capital market integration in the European Union. Report commissioned by the European 
Commission. 
Afonso, A. (2003). Understanding the determinants of sovereign debt ratings: evidence for the 
two leading agencies. Journal of Economics and Finance, 27(1), p56-74. 
Afonso, A., Gomes, P. & Rother, P. (2007). What ‗hides‘ behind sovereign debt ratings? 
European Central Bank Working Paper Series, 711. 
Auzairy, N. & Ahmad, R. (2009). The impact of subsequent stock market liberalization on the 
integration of stock markets in ASEAN-4 + South Korea. World Academy of Science, 
Engineering and Technology, 58, p348-359. 
Ayuso, J. & Blanco, R. (2001). Has financial market integration increased during the nineties? 
Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money, 11, p265-287. 
Baele, L., Ferrando, A., Hordahl, P., Krylova, E. & Monnet, C. (2004). Measuring financial 
integration in the Euro area. European Central Bank Occasional Paper, 14. 
Bekaert, G. & Harvey, C. (1995). Time-varying world market integration. Journal of Finance, 
50(2), p403-444. 
Bekaert, G. & Harvey, C. (1997). Emerging equity market volatility. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43, p29-77. 
Bekaert, G. & Harvey, C. (2003). Emerging markets finance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 10, 
p3-55. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C. & Siegel, S. (2007). Global growth opportunities and 
market integration. Journal of Finance, 62(3), p1081-1137. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C., Lundblad, C. & Siegel, S. (2011). What segments equity markets? 
Review of Financial Studies, 24(12), p3841-3890. 
28 
 
Berkman, H., Jacobsen, B. & Lee, J. (2011). Time-varying rare disaster risk and stock returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), p313-332. 
Brounrn, D. & Derwall, J. (2010). The impact of terrorist attacks on international stock markets. 
European Financial Management, 16(4), p585-598. 
Brown, S. & Warner, J. (1985). Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 14, p3-31. 
Bruner, R., Li, W., Kritzman, M., Myrgren, S. & Page, S. (2008). Market integration in 
developed and emerging markets: evidence from the CAPM. Emerging Markets Review, 
9(2), p89-103. 
Butler, A. & Fauver. L. (2006). Institutional environment and sovereign credit ratings. Financial 
Management, 35(3), p53-79. 
Carrieri, F., Errunza, V. & Hogan, K. (2009). Characterizing world market integration through 
time. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42, p915-940. 
Chen, A. & Siems, T. (2004). The effects of terrorism on global capital markets. European 
Journal of Political Economy, 20, p349-366. 
Chesney, M., Reshetar, G. & Karaman, M. (2011). The impact of terrorism on financial markets: 
an empirical study. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(2), p253-267. 
Corrado, C. (1989). A non parametric test for abnormal security price performance in event 
studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 23, p385-395. 
De Santis, G., Gerard, B. & Hillion, P. (2003). The relevance of currency risk in the EMU. 
Journal of Economics and Business, 55, p427-462. 
Dumas, B. & Solnik, B. (1995). The world price of exchange rate risk. Journal of Finance, 50, 
p445-479. 
Eldor, R. & Melnick, R. (2004). Financial markets and terrorism. European Journal of Political 
Economy, 20, p367-386. 
 
29 
 
Errunza, V., Losq, E. & Padmanabhan, P. (1992). Tests of integration, mild segmentation and 
segmentation hypotheses. Journal of Banking Finance, 16, p949-972. 
Fratzscher, M. (2002). Financial market integration in Europe: on the effects of EMU on stock 
markets. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 7, p165-193. 
Frijns, B., Tourani-Rad, A. & Indriawan, I. (2012). Political crises and the stock market 
integration of emerging markets. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(3), p644-653. 
Garmaise, M. & Moskowitz, T. (2009). Catastrophic risk and credit markets. Journal of Finance, 
64(2), p657-707. 
Gerard, B., Thanyalakpark, K. & Batten, J. (2003). Are the East Asian markets integrated? 
Evidence from the ICAPM. Journal of Economics and Business, 55, p585-607. 
Gultekin, M., Gultekin, B. & Penati, A. (1989). Capital controls and international capital market 
segmentation: the evidence from the Japanese and American stock markets. Journal of 
Finance, 44(4), p849-869. 
Harvey, C. (1991). The world price of covariance risk. Journal of Finance, 46(1), p111-157. 
Karolyi, G. (2006). Shock markets: What do we know about terrorism and the financial markets? 
Canadian Investment Review, 19(2), p9-15. 
Karolyi, A. & Martell, R. (2010). Terrorism and the stock market. International Review of 
Applied Finance Issues and Economics, 2(2), p285-314. 
Korajczyk, R. (1996). A measure of stock market integration for developed and emerging 
markets. World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), p267-289. 
Levine, R. & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American 
Economic Review, 88, p537-558. 
Makinen, G. (2002). The economic effects of 9/11: a retrospective assessment. Congressional 
Research Service. Library of Congress. 
 
30 
 
Maloney, M. & Mulherin, H. (2003). The complexity of price discovery in an efficient market: 
the stock market reaction to the Challenger crash. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, p453-
479. 
McWilliams, A. & Siegel, D. (1997). Event studies in management research: theoretical and 
empirical issues. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), p626-657. 
Ng, A. (2000). Volatility spillover effects from Japan and the U.S. to the Pacific-Basin. Journal 
of International Money and Finance, 19, p207-233. 
Patro, D. (2005). Stock market liberalization and emerging market country fund premiums. 
Journal of Business, 78(1), p135-168. 
Pukthuanthong, K. & Roll, R. (2009). Global market integration: an alternative measure and its 
application. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), p214-232. 
Ragunathan, V. (1999). Financial deregulation and integration: an Australian perspective. 
Journal of Economics & Business, 51(6), p505-514. 
Solnik, B. (1983). International arbitrage pricing theory. Journal of Finance, 38, p449-457. 
Van Wincoop, E. (1999). How big are potential welfare gains from international risk sharing? 
Journal of International Economics, 47, p109-235. 
Worthington, A. & Valadkhani, A. (2004). Measuring the impact of natural disasters on capital 
markets: an empirical application using intervention analysis. Applied Economics, 36(19), 
p2177-2186. 
Yeoh, B., Arsad, Z., & Hooy, C. (2010). Stock market integration measurement: investigation of 
Malaysia and Singapore stock markets. World Academy of Science, Engineering and 
Technology, 66, p1585-1590. 
 
